A large literature establishes that hiring police officers leads to reductions in crime and that investments in police are a relatively efficient means of crime control compared to investments in prisons. One concern, however, is that because police officers make arrests in the course of their duties, police hiring, while relatively efficient, is an inevitable driver of "mass incarceration." This research considers the dynamics through which police hiring affects downstream incarceration rates. Using state-level panel data as well county-level data from California, we uncover novel evidence in favor of a potentially unexpected and yet entirely intuitive result -that investments in law enforcement are unlikely to markedly increase state prison populations and may even lead to a modest decrease in the number of state prisoners. As such, investments in police may, in fact, yield a "double dividend" to society, by reducing incarceration rates as well as crime rates.
Introduction
There are two primary mechanisms through which criminal justice policy inputs like police and prisons can reduce crime: deterrence and incapacitation. Deterrence represents a behavioral response of crime to a given crime control strategy and is based on the idea that a rational offender will reduce the amount of crime he supplies when the price of crime (which is, in turn, a function of the certainty of apprehension and the severity of the expected sanction) increases.
This conception of deterrence is a core idea in Becker's seminal contribution to the economics of crime and in Cornish and Clarke's The Reasoning Criminal and can be found in early treatises on the subject by marchese di Beccaria (1785) and Bentham (1793) and later extensions by Ehrlich (1973) , Shavell (1991) and McCrary et al. (2010) among others.
1 Incapacitation, on the other hand, represents a mechanical response of crime to police and is premised on the idea that by arresting and subsequently incarcerating offenders, some number of crimes will be abated -or incapacitated -away. 2 Deterrence, it is has been noted, is inexpensive relative to incapacitation (Nagin, 2013) .
While preventing crimes via incapacitation requires that municipal and state governments finance the considerable costs of arresting, adjudicating and confining offenders, deterrence has far fewer marginal costs. Accordingly, the relative efficiency of a given crime control strategy will depend on the relative mix of deterrence and incapacitation effects that the strategy generates.
Critically, if deterrence effects are sufficiently large it is possible for a crime control strategy to 1 There is also a rich literature on perceptual deterrence -the extent to which potential offenders are wellinformed about the risks of offending -with notable contributions including Chiricos & Waldo (1970) , Paternoster et al. (1983) and Loughran et al. (2011) . See Apel (2013) for a detailed review of this literature. 2 A large literature on "criminal careers" provides evidence on the size of incapacitation effects by seeking to understand the general productivity level of offenders (Blumstein et al., 1986; Hirschi et al., 1986; Visher & Roth, 1986; Nagin & Land, 1993; D'unger et al., 1998) .
reduce both crime and incarceration, allowing society to achieve a "double dividend" in which two costly outcomes -crime and resources allocated to crime control -are simultaneously minimized (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011) .
A critical task then for scholars of criminal justice policy is to generate evidence not only around the effectiveness of a given crime control strategy but also its efficiency in reducing crime. Naturally, one of the principal crime control strategies employed by governments around the world are public investments in law enforcement. A large literature considers the responsiveness of crime to the presence and availability of police and finds that police resources have a modest but, in general, important impact on crime. 3 With respect to police manpower, prevailing estimates suggest an elasticity of between -0.4 to -1 for violent crimes and approximately -0.2 to -0.5 for property crimes (Marvell & Moody, 1996; McCrary, 2002; Levitt, 2002; Evans & Owens, 2007; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2010; DeAngelo & Hansen, 2014 ; P. J. Weisburst, 2016) and that, given these estimates, the benefits of hiring police officers likely exceeds the cost of doing so (Chalfin & McCrary, 2017a) . 4 The extent to which police are an efficient crime control strategy is less certain as it is difficult to empirically disentangle deterrence from incapacitation effects (Kessler & Levitt, 1999; Webster et al., 2006; Owens, 2013) . However, in summarizing the literature, scholars have noted that there is considerable evidence -both theoretical and empirical -to suggest that invest- 3 Crime is found to be responsive to re-deployments of police following a terror attack (Di Tella & Schargrodsky, 2004; Klick & Tabarrok, 2005; Draca et al., 2011) or a traffic collision (S. Weisburd, 2016) . Crime has likewise been found to to decline in the presence of targeted police surges (MacDonald et al., 2016) and increases when police disengage from the community (Shi, 2009 ). Quasi-experimental findings are bolstered by numerous experimental studies on deployments of police to crime hot spots (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Braga et al., 1999; Braga & Bond, 2008; D. Weisburd et al., 2012; Blattman et al., 2017) . 4 An exception in the literature is Kovandzic & Sloan (2002) which finds little evidence of an impact of police hiring on crime. See Eck & Maguire (2000) , Sherman (2011) and Y. Lee, Eck, & Corsaro (2016) for excellent and detailed reviews of the literature. ments in law enforcement are a relatively efficient means of controlling crime when compared to investments in corrections (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011; Nagin, 2013; Chalfin & McCrary, 2017b) .
Empirically, this is seen in recent estimates of the elasticity of crime with respect to the prison population which is, at most, approximately -0.1 to -0.2, considerably smaller in magnitude than the crime-police elasticity (Liedka et al., 2006; Cullen et al., 2011; Durlauf & Nagin, 2011; Johnson & Raphael, 2012; Nagin, 2013; Raphael et al., 2017) . With respect to theory, beginning with Bentham (1793) , scholars have noted that since apprehension and subsequent incarceration are both uncertain and indeed improbable for most crimes, to the extent that offenders are myopic, offending will be more sensitive to the certainty of punishment which is experienced in the present rather than the severity of punishment which is experienced in the future (Paternoster, 2010; Durlauf & Nagin, 2011; Nagin, 2013 ; D. S. Lee & McCrary, 2017) . Given the modest relationship between crime and state prison populations as well as the concern that the experience of prison could itself be criminogenic, a consensus has developed among criminal justice policy scholars that social planners could maximize the effectiveness of public safety resources by re-allocating away from investments in incarceration and towards investments in law enforcement (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011; Chalfin & McCrary, 2017b) .
In recent years, as crime has declined from its national peak in the early 1990s, policymakers and citizens alike have turned their attention to the collateral harms of incarceration -costs that fall disproportionately on low income, racially segregated neighborhoods from which the incarcerated population is predominately drawn (Hagan & Dinovitzer, 1999; Genty, 2002; Clear, 2009; Foster & Hagan, 2009; Turanovic et al., 2012; Aizer & Doyle Jr, 2015; Mueller-Smith, 2015) .
As attention has turned to the social harms of "mass incarceration," it has been suggested that spending on both prisons and police have been excessive (Tonry, 2011) . After all, the story goes, even if the police affect crime partially through deterrence, given that police make arrests -approximately thirteen per officer per year according to the Bureau of Justice Statisticsthey must also incapacitate offenders and therefore contribute directly to the staggering scale of incarceration growth in the United States.
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In this paper, we note that such analysis is not a foregone conclusion and that the extent to which -and even whether -investments in police lead to greater incarceration rates is an empirical question, one that depends on the precise mix of deterrence and incapacitation effects through which police reduce crime. To the extent that a sufficiently large share of the impact of police is through deterrence, then it is possible for police to have the attractive quality of reducing both crime and incarceration. This conversation has gone hand in hand with a scholarly and public debate on disproportionate police surveillance of low income and disadvantaged predominantly minority communities and has generated a great deal of recent scholarly attention with respect to the consequences of aggressive "stop, question and frisk" policies (Corman & Mocan, 2005; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; MacDonald et al., 2016; Goel et al., 2016 ) and whether or not there is a "Ferguson effect" in American policing (Pyrooz et al., 2016; Rosenfeld, 2016; Shjarback et al., 2017) . 6 Naturally, the mechanisms through which police reduce crime will depend on how they are used. This paper considers the impact of resources allocated to law enforcement, holding fixed the mix of policing strategies and tactics that individual departments employ. Both Be Reduced?" which speculates that policies that affect the certainty of punishment can potentially have the attractive quality of yielding a double dividend.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that the effect of investments in law enforcement on downstream incarceration rates is a key policy estimand with broad implications for how public safety resources are allocated, we have been unable to locate an estimate of this quantity in the literature. The closest research we are aware of is that of (Owens, 2013) who uses a clever identification strategy -the quasi-random roll-out of hiring grants from the Department of Justice's COPS Office -to estimate the marginal impact of police hiring on the number of arrests made at the agency level and, intriguingly, finds little evidence that arrests increase with police hiring which narrows the scope for incapacitation effects to be large.
While this evidence suggests that the scope for police to generate large incapacitation effects is modest and therefore that police reduce crime primarily through deterrence, we argue that an analysis of arrests is not sufficient to draw a conclusion about the effect of police on new prison commitments. To support this claim, we note that the empirical relationship between arrests and prison admissions is far from perfect. Indeed, for a given state, the number of arrests made is a modest predictor of the number subsequent prison spells. How can this be? As it turns out, there is substantial slippage in the criminal justice system between arrests and subsequent prison spells. Indeed for most serious crimes, the conditional probability of a prison spell given a criminal charge is around 40 percent and many arrests are not converted into sustained criminal charges in the first place. The rate at which arrests convert into prison spells depends on many factors including the type of arrest, the strength of the available evidence, the dynamics of plea bargaining and the de jure and de facto sentencing regimes in a given jurisdiction. This is not merely an academic point as a number of scholars have noted the importance of prosecutorial discretion in generating exponential growth in incarceration (Pfaff, 2011 (Pfaff, , 2014 .
This research addresses the important but understudied question of whether more intensive investments in law enforcement lead to an increase in the size of a state's prison population. Using state-level panel data as well as more detailed county-level panel data from California, we estimate the effect of increases in police expenditures on actual and expected new prison commitments. In order to address the traditional concern that annual changes in police expenditures may be endogenous, we appeal to an instrumental variables strategy that is a mainstay of the literature on police manpower and crime -one that leverages the empirical regularity that investments in law enforcement tend to move in tandem with investments in fire safety (Levitt, 2002; Kovandzic et al., 2016) .
8 Empirically, we demonstrate that this is the case both amongst states at the national level and amongst counties in California.
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While estimates are not sufficiently precise to completely rule out a positive relationship between investments in law enforcement and the growth of a state's prison population, the available data suggest that the effect of police spending on new prison commitments is more likely than not to be negative and, critically, is highly unlikely to be large and positive. Even using an extraordinarily pessimistic estimate of the effect of police spending on prison commitments (arising from the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval of our preferred 8 As Levitt notes, the intuition for this relationship is straightforward -institutional details such as the power of public sector unions, citizen tastes for government services and the predilection of politicians to "provide spoils" to their electorates suggest that police and fire safety budgets might covary. 9 Our identification strategy, which uses variation in police spending that is explained by spending on fire safety, is valid so long as expenditures on fire safety aggregated to the state level are uncorrelated with new prison admissions, except through police hiring. To the extent that this empirical strategy, like all identification strategies, is imperfect, we argue that this source of identification is sufficient to support the findings in this paper because any remaining bias is likely to be positive -that is, towards least squares estimates -if investments in fire safety are positively correlated with broader investments in public safety. Since our estimates of the effect of police spending on prison admissions point in the negative direction, the fire safety instrument would thus provide an upper bound on this critical policy estimand. We argue that an upper bound is particularly useful in this context. estimate), the premise that increases in spending on law enforcement has been a driver of mass incarceration is very unlikely to be true.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II motivates a simple mathematical model of the criminal justice system and facilitates a set of expectations against which the empirical analysis may be compared. In Section III we present the paper's empirical strategy.
Section IV discusses the data used in the research, Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes.
Police and Prison Spells: A Simple Model
In this section, we motivate a simple model of police hiring and its downstream effects. The purpose of this discussion is to elucidate the conditions under which police hiring will either increase or decrease the rate of new prison admissions. The model is simple but realistic and generates predictions which provide context for the empirical estimates we present later in the paper.
We begin by considering a society that, at time t , employs N t police officers and experiences Now assume that between years t and t +1 our hypothetical society allocates more resources to police and hires some additional number of police officers. 11 In year t +1, the society will employ N t +1 officers, will experience Y t +1 crimes and will record A t +1 = Y t +1 P t +1 arrests which will lead to q t +1 Y t +1 P t +1 new prison commitments. Our task is to identify the underlying dynamics of how the rate of new prison commitments responds to police -specifically we will be interested in the elasticity of new prison commitments with respect to police which we denote using ε c . To derive this, first note that:
The numerator of (1) is the percentage change in the number of prison commitments and the denominator is the percentage change in the number of police officers. When
when police do not affect the rate at which arrests are converted into prison sentences -as they could through better resourced investigations), the change in prison commitments will be proportional to the change in arrests.
Equation (1) can be re-written more compactly using elasticity notation. Let ε p , ε c and ε y 11 In principle, the society could also allocate more overtime hours to the existing officers. We focus on the number of officers hired for simplicity.
be the elasticities of the probability of apprehension, the probability of a prison commitment and the number of crimes with respect to the number of police, respectively. In that case the elasticity of new prison commitments with respect to police can be written as:
Setting (2) equal to zero allows us to characterize the trade-off between ε q , ε p and ε y . If we fix ∆N = 0.01 (e.g., assuming that we observe a one percent increase in police) and re-arrange, then
(2) can be re-written as:
When the left-hand side of (3) is greater than the right-hand side of (3), ε c < 0, meaning that police hiring leads to an decrease in prison commitments. If ε q = 0, then in order for police hiring to lead to an increase in prison spells, 1 + ε p 100
. Practically speaking, this means that whether police hiring increases or decreases the flow of prisoners depends on the relative magnitudes of ε p and ε y .
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Next, we note that the prior literature indicates that ε y < 0 and theory would suggest that ε p and ε q should both be non-negative. Critically, whether police lead to larger or smaller flows of prisoners depends on the magnitudes of ε p and ε q as well as the interaction of these two quantities. Thus, for a given sum of the two elasticities, there is greater upward pressure on the prison population when ε p and ε q are equal in magnitude. Conversely, upward pressure 12 Technically, the break-even point is achieved when |ε p | is slightly larger than |ε y |.
on the prison population is minimized when one of the elasticities is zero. Provided that ε y is approximately -0.5 to -1 which is consistent with the prior literature, either ε p or ε q will need to be quite large for police hiring to increase the size of a state's prison population. In other words, in order for police to increase the incarceration rate, more police resources will need to increase crime clearance rates and the efficacy of investigations considerably. For instance, if expanding the size of a city's police force by 10% increased both the clearance rate and the rate at which arrests lead to prison spells by 2%, it is unlikely that this would be sufficient to lead to an increase in the number of prison spells.
While empirical estimates of these elasticities are difficult to come by, we note that an important literature in criminology has been skeptical that faster police response times (a leading way in which police resources would affect clearance rates) yield higher crime clearance rates (Bayley, 1996; Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Walker & Katz, 2012; Siegel & Worrall, 2013) . 13 A smaller literature has attempted to study the effect of police on clearance rates directly and has generally found very modest effects at most (Bennett, 1982; Puckett & Lundman, 2003) . This exercise thus casts some doubt on whether ε p and ε q are sufficiently large to lead to a positive prisonpolice elasticity. Indeed, empirical estimates reported in Section V of the paper suggest that this elasticity is more likely to be negative than positive.
Empirical Strategy
This research seeks to generate a national estimate of the effect of investments in law enforcement on new commitments to state prisons. While, later in the paper, we will sometimes ex- 13 The largest estimates we can find of the effect of police response times on clearance rates comes from a recent paper by Vidal & Kirchmaier (2017) who report an elasticity of -0.47.
press results in terms of the number of police officers employed, recognizing that overtime hours are a key law enforcement input, we model the relationship between new prison commitments and expenditures on law enforcement salaries as this better captures the magnitude of society's investment in police manpower. Following Owens (2013) , the model we would ideally like to estimate is:
In (4)
, COM M I T i t is the number of new prison commitments in state i in year t , POLIC E i t −1
are expenditures (in tens of thousands of dollars) on law enforcement in the previous year, X i t is a vector of time-varying control variables and φ i and γ t are state and year fixed effects, respectively. 14 In keeping with the standard model employed in the literature, we lag police spending by one year so as to minimize simultaneity bias (Marvell & Moody, 1996; Evans & Owens, 2007; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2010; Chalfin & McCrary, 2017a ).
There are two primary challenges in estimating this equation. The first is aggregation bias, a concern that arises because police spending varies across cities within a given state whereas prison admissions are measured state-wide in our data. The specific concern is that, by aggregating city-level law enforcement data to the state level, we face a classical ecological inference problem -that of deducing the nature of individuals from inferences for the group to which those individuals belong. While this is a common issue in the applied literature, to address this concern thoughtfully, we augment our national analysis with an analysis of data on county-level prison admissions in California, re-estimating (4) at the county-level within California. 15 The resulting estimates are remarkably similar to national estimates which aggregate to the state level, providing confidence that the level of aggregation is not a first order issue for estimation.
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A second estimation challenge is that police spending may be endogenous and thus estimating (4) via ordinary least squares could return an inconsistent estimate of τ. In particular, the concern that has been articulated in the literature is that cities might have the ability to manipulate police spending in anticipation of a future change in crime, a prospect that has been raised by many scholars in this area, beginning with Marvell & Moody (1996) and Levitt (2002) .
To the extent that this is true, there will be a mechanical correlation between police on the one hand and crime or incarceration rates on the other, thus leading to an upward bias in estimating τ.
Economists, in particular, have devoted careful attention to addressing endogeneity problems in the literature but is year-over-year police spending actually endogenous? Our reading of the political science and public administration literatures is that the realities of city constraints and politics make strategic police hiring extremely difficult, dampening the scope for endogeneity of this type. In particular, cities labor under state-and city-level statutory and constitutional requirements that they balance their budgets annually, 17 they face tax and expendi- 15 We note that aggregation at the state level is a common choice in the applied literature, including in a number of classic papers, both as a means of studying state-level interventions or outcomes and as a way to deal with measurement errors at lower levels of aggregation (Chiricos, 1987; Levitt, 1996; Marvell & Moody, 1996; Levitt, 1998; Donohue III & Levitt, 2001; Duggan, 2001; Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Donohue III & Wolfers, 2006; Bohn et al., 2014; Donohue et al., 2017; Lofstrom et al., 2014) . 16 A second type of aggregation bias worth mentioning is temporal aggregation. Here the challenge is that there is a temporal lag between the time when an arrest is made by a police officer and a subsequent prison admission -if the arrest, in fact, results in one. We deal with this by specifying that police affect prison admissions with a one-year lag. However, to ensure the robustness of estimates we further aggregate the data up into two-year bins.
Results indicate that, if anything, our primary estimates are conservative. 17 See Cope (1992) , Lewis (1994) , Rubin (2016) for a detailed discussion of this point.
ture limitations, 18 they may suffer from inattention regarding staffing or may utilize staffing reductions as bargaining chips (e.g., bailout-seeking), 19 and they may be hamstrung by unilateral changes to state and federal revenue sharing funds that are difficult to anticipate. 20 In addition, state and local civil service ordinances necessitate a lengthy hiring process making it difficult to adjust policing levels quickly or in great numbers. Finally, cities may suffer from important principal-agent problems with elected officials having potentially quite different objectives from those of the median voter. In short, cities face binding liquidity constraints, limited information, inattention, and perhaps even self-commitment problems in hiring more police officers in anticipation of a crime wave, a prospect which is discussed in considerable detail in (Chalfin & McCrary, 2017a Poterba & Rueben (1995) , Shadbegian (1998) and Shavell (1991) . 19 See, for example, LA Times (1966), Ireton (1976 ), or Recktenwald (1986a . A common pattern is for police departments to have hired a large cohort of officers at some point. For some cities, this was after World War II, for other cities it was the late 1950s, and for other cities it was the 1960s crime wave. Combined with typical pension plans pegged to 20 years or 25 years of service, many departments face retirement waves roughly two decades after a hiring wave, setting the stage for a 20 to 25 year cycle unless the city exercises foresight. For example, in response to the famous Boston Police Strike of 1919, in which nearly three-quarters of the police department went on strike on September 9, then-governor Calvin Coolidge, having assumed control of the department on an emergency basis, refused to allow the strikers to return to work and replaced them all with veterans from World War I (Boston Police Department, 1919; Russell, 2005) . This hiring burst, combined with the State-Boston Retirement System which provides for a defined benefit pension after 10 years if over 55 and after 20 years if of any age, led to a highly persistent "lumpiness" in the tenure distribution of the department (Boston Police Department, 1940, Table VI) . 20 Relevant federal programs over this time period include the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) , the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance programs (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant pro-gram (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , the Justice Assistance Grant (2006-present) , and the Community Oriented Policing Services (1994-present) . For background on federal programs, see Varon (1974) , Hevesi (2005) , Richman (2006) , and James (2013). At its peak in the late 1970s, LEAA funding accounted for roughly 5 percent of state and local criminal justice expenditures (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1977) . Background on state programs, which are ubiquitous, is much more scarce, but see Richardson (1980) . 21 This paper demonstrates that differences between prior OLS and 2SLS estimates in the literature that studies the effect of police hiring on crime differ largely because of measurement errors in police manpower data in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, rather than due to endogeneity bias as has been supposed. We note that in the present paper, we are aggregating agency-level data to the state level, and, as such, measurement error bias should be a far less concerning issue in our data as the resulting errors are likely to smooth out in the aggregation. Thus, in the absence of considerable endogeneity bias, OLS and 2SLS estimates should be more similar to each other than in the city-level analyses in the extant literature. therefore ought to be addressed. In order to deal with the potential endogeneity of investments in law enforcement, researchers generally turn to an instrumental variable -a variable that is correlated with the regressor of interest (law enforcement spending) but which is not related to the outcome of interest (in our case, new prison commitments) except through the potentially endogenous regressor. The idea behind such an identification strategy is intuitive: to the extent that the instrument captures some portion of the variation in law enforcement spending that is exogenous, this variable can be used to separate endogenous from exogenous variation in order to generate a consistent estimate of the effect of law enforcement spending on downstream incarceration rates. Instruments that have been used in this literature include mayoral and gubernatorial election cycles (Levitt, 2002) , COPS hiring grants (Evans & Owens, 2007; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2007; Weisburst, 2016; and investments in fire safety (Levitt, 2002) . Our mandate is to select an instrumental variable that predicts investments in law enforcement and which is ideally unrelated to prison admissions except through its correlation with investments in law enforcement.
A challenge is that this instrument must be valid (that is, it must predict law enforcement spending) as well as relevant enough to generate a sufficiently precise estimate of the quantity of interest. This is easier said than done -while scholars often point to an F -statistic of 10 (or 14 with respect to 10% maximial bias according to simulations by Stock & Yogo (2005) ) as a sufficient rule of thumb for an unbiased second stage estimate, we note that this is not a sufficient statistic for a precise estimate of the second stage parameter. What we will need is an instrument that is not only predictive enough to generate a consistent estimate of the effect of police but the instrument must also explain a sufficiently large share of the variation in police expenditures in order to be useful. This discussion is not merely academic -as noted by Kovandzic, Schaffer, Vieraitis, Orrick, & Piquero (2016) , identifying strong instruments has been a key challenge for this literature which has been plagued, to a large degree, by sizable standard errors and therefore by considerable parameter uncertainty (Chalfin & McCrary, 2017a Levitt notes that, for a variety of institutional reasons, police and firefighter hiring will tend to move together. In particular, it has been noted that the power of public sector unions, citizen tastes for government services and the predilection of politicians to "provide spoils" to their electorates suggest that police and fire safety budgets might covary. Empirically, we verify that this is the case at the state-level. The instrument is both relevant and sufficiently strong to draw reasonable inferences about the relationship between police hiring and prison growth.
With respect to the exclusion restriction, the primary argument in favor of the validity of the identification strategy is simple: firefighters do not have sworn arrest powers and so they do not directly affect crime or subsequent prison admissions. Indeed, as firefighters do not go on routine patrols as do police officers, it is difficult to see how firefighters would have a first order effect on crime. In selecting an identification strategy that uses expenditures on fire safety, we are asserting that we believe this statement to be reasonable and, to first order, true, a prospect which has received support in Levitt (2002) and subsequently in Kovandzic, Schaffer, Vieraitis, Orrick, & Piquero (2016) among others. 22 In support of this assertion, we note that, holding police spending constant, spending on firefighters is uncorrelated with new prison commitments and is uncorrelated with changes in a city's demographic composition and it's crime rates.
However, we need not be completely blind to potential violations of the exclusion restriction. In particular, investments in police and fire safety could be part and parcel of a "safety first" approach to governing which also involves harsher sentencing or further investments in prison infrastructure. To the extent that this is true, the instrument will be positively correlated with prison admissions, other than through its correlation with police. Critically though, this bias would be in the direction of the least squares estimate and is therefore conservative
given that the 2SLS estimates that we present in Section 5 point in the negative direction and are larger in magnitude than their least squares counterparts. Thus, in using these estimates to rule out a large positive relationship between law enforcement spending and prison growth, a critic would have to believe that spending on fire safety is negatively related to policy choices that lead to higher incarceration rates even though firefighter spending is positively related to police spending. 23 Ultimately, we note that OLS and 2SLS estimates are, in practice, quite similar which indicates that, at the state level, police hiring may not be nearly as endogenous as has been supposed.
Using investments in fire safety as an instrumental variable motivates the following simul-22 Our reading of Kovandzic, Schaffer, Vieraitis, Orrick, & Piquero (2016) is that they question the strength of the first stage in Levitt's original analytic sample but not the underlying validity of the identification strategy. 23 Another concern is that a third factor might affect both expenditures on police and firefighters as well as prisons -for example, a recession. In order to account for this possibility, we control extensively for changes in the local economy and, critically, also for the size of a state's total budget and its spending on corrections. Thus, we estimate the first stage regression of police spending on firefighter spending, holding other state budgets constant.
taneous equation framework which is solved straightforwardly using 2SLS:
Equation (5) is the first stage equation in which we regress police expenditures on fire expenditures, net of covariates and fixed effects -in practice, following Owens (2013), we use state and interacted region-year fixed effects. Equation (6) is the reduced form which provides an estimate of the effect of expenditures on fire safety on prison admissions. Dividing δ in (6) by η in (5) yields the 2SLS estimate of the effect of police spending on prison admissions. Models are weighted by the state population in 1997, the initial year in our data -however results are not sensitive to the population weights. In all models, to account for arbitrary serial correlation in the residuals, standard errors are clustered at the state level (Bertrand et al., 2004) .
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Data
The goal of this research is to estimate the effect of investments in law enforcement on the number of new commitments to state prisons. To do so, we use data from six different sources and build a state-year panel dataset that spans the time period from 1997-2015, a period in which police and prison populations increased at roughly equal rates. In this section, we provide detail on the source of our data and how our analytic dataset is constructed.
Prison Admissions
The 
State and Local Expenditures
State and local payroll for police officers and firefighters come from the Annual Survey of Public Employment and Payroll (ASPEP) which has been collected each year by the U.S. Census Bureau since 1957. 26 The ASPEP contains data on state and local government resource outlays by sector (e.g., police, fire safety, education, sewerage, etc) using information sourced from each jurisdic- 25 We also estimate the effect of law enforcement spending on all new prison admissions as a robustness check and all results are very similar. 26 Since then, the sole year in which the ASPEP was not conducted is 1996.
tion's March payroll report. 27 This information includes the number of individuals employed in each jurisdiction-sector as of March 30th of each year as well as salary outlays which, when multiplied by 12 is a reasonable approximation for annual salary expenditures. Due to the high costs of data collection, the information is collected from a strategic sample of municipalities.
The Census Bureau surveys large cities (> 250,000 population) annually and randomly samples smaller cities from year to year. 28 Given that our outcome (new prison commitments) is measured at the state level, we aggregate the March payroll information to the state level, adjusting for inflation. While the aggregated series will contain some noise due to the sampling strategy, random sampling means that the series should not be biased and the fact that large cities are always represented in the data mean that year-to-year noise is thankfully minimal. As we show, state-level information on police and fire expenditures are quite closely related despite any noise in the data.
We also use total government expenditure for payroll (for all sectors combined) in order to compute total government expenditures, a key control variable in our regression models. 27 Prior to 1996, the ASPEP collected information from the October payroll. 28 Twice per decade (in years ending in a "2" or a "7") information is collected from all cities. 29 The annual statistics generally reflect fiscal year expenditures that end on June 30th. There are four states with other ending dates: Alabama and Michigan (September 30th), New York (March 31st), and Texas (August 31st).
on corrections.
Crimes and Arrests
Data on the number of crimes and arrests come from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uni- 
Other National Data
Finally, we tabulate auxiliary demographic and economic data using the annual American Com- State governor data was downloaded from the National Governors Association website and contains the political party for each governor and their years in office. We convert this data to 31 Due to inconsistent reporting by the Chicago Police Department (e.g. no data on rape), we exclude Illinois. 32 The percent of people employed and the unemployment rate consider only people aged 16 or older.
a binary variable with a value of 1 if the governorship was held by Republicans that year and a 0 otherwise. In years when multiple parties held the governorship (i.e. when a new governor is inaugurated), we use the party that held the office latest in the year. As most inaugurations are early in the year, this measures which party held power during that year.
Auxiliary Data from California
As the National Prisoner Statistic data set contains only state-level prisoner admission counts, Pierson, Hand, & Thompson (2015) . This data contains the spending by all governments within jurisdiction which we aggregate to the county-level. 
Results
Before presenting our main findings, it is worth providing a descriptive examination at the data which are summarized in Table 2 . In this table, we report the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of variables used in subsequent regression models. Given the panel structure of the data, we also report overall ("O"), within ("W") and between ("B") state standard deviations to provide a sense for where the identifying variation comes from. Data on arrests are drawn from the pool of agencies that consistently report to the UCR and consequently these figures should not be construed as state-year totals. We limit our analytic sample to state-years for which there are no non-missing data. In our data, an average state spends approximately $970 million in salaries annually on approximately 13,400 police officers for an average of $72,000
per officer. We also explore trends in several key variables -Part I crimes, arrests, sworn police officers and new prison commitments -in Figure 1 .
In order to provide a sense for the "productivity" of average officer, we appeal to national data from both the UCR and the Bureau of Justice Statistics. These data are summarized in Table 3 . Using data for the 2014-2015 period, the United States employs approximately 800,000 sworn police officers for a population of 320 million people, a rate of 250 officers per 100,000
residents. Each year, there are approximately 11 million arrests in the United States of which just over 2 million are for index crimes and another 1.7 million are for drug or weapons violations.
The remaining 7 million arrests are generally for minor offenses which are unlikely to lead to a custodial prison sentence. It is easy to see that this is true when considering the annual number of new prison commitments which number approximately 600,000.
The descriptive data suggests three main points. First, while there is likely to be a great deal of heterogeneity among police officers depending on their assigned duties, an "average" officer makes relatively few arrests for serious crimes during the course of a year -by our calculations, an average officer will make approximately 13.8 arrests of which 2.6 are for index crimes and another 2.1 are for drug or weapons violations. Hence, while police officers may do a great deal to reduce crime by doing things like maintaining visibility, conducting street stops and undertaking preventive patrol, a typical officer makes relatively few "serious" arrests -perhaps around 4 or 5 per year. Second, arrests -even index crime arrests -are unlikely to lead to a prison spell. Nationally, the probability that an arrest will lead to a prison spell is just over 5
percent. Even when we consider arrests for crimes that potentially carry long sentences such as index crimes and drug and weapons violations, there are 6 of these arrests each year for every new prison spell. Finally, putting all of the data together, given that there are 800,000 sworn officers and 600,000 annual prison spells in the United States, an average officer incapacitates fewer than one individual per year in state prison. Thus, unless this individual is highly productive and would have committed a very large number of crimes had he not been incarcerated, the scope for officers to generate sizable incapacitation effects may be smaller than is sometimes supposed. This is underscored by recent research which suggests that, in recent years, the marginal offender is, in fact, unlikely to be all that productive (Liedka et al., 2006; Cullen et al., 2011; Durlauf & Nagin, 2011; Johnson & Raphael, 2012; Nagin, 2013; Raphael et al., 2017) .
The main results are contained in Table 4 and are discussed below. In Table 4 , for each dependent variable -crimes, arrests, expected new prison spells (defined below) and actual new court commitments to prison -we present estimates of the effect of an increase in $10,000
of spending on law enforcement personnel. We present least squares estimates of the effect of law enforcement spending on key outcomes as well as 2SLS models in which spending on law enforcement is instrumented using spending on firefighters. We also present robust standard errors, clustered at the state level and the resulting 95 percent confidence interval. 34 All models are estimated using 722 observations, covering 41 states over the 1997-2015 sample period.
Throughout the discussion of results, we interpret the 2SLS estimates rather than the least squares estimates. However, we note that these coefficients are very close in magnitude to the least squares estimates. This is consistent with the idea that, due to political and operational constraints, police hiring, in practice, is less endogenous than has been supposed and that measurement errors in police data are less severe at the state rather than the local level Chalfin & McCrary (2017a) .
First Stage
We begin by documenting the first stage relationship between expenditures on police personnel and expenditures on firefighters at the state level. While Levitt (2002) shows that this relationship is fairly strong at the city level, this relationship need not automatically hold at the state level. Visually, the relationship between police and firefighter spending is presented in Figure   2 . In the scatterplot, both police and firefighter spending are regressed on state and region-year fixed effects as well as covariates and the residuals are taken and plotted against one another. A large percentage of the variation in police spending is explained by spending on fire safety. Conditional on control variables (including a state's total budget) and state and interacted regionyear fixed effects, each $10,000 spent on fire safety predicts approximately $16,000 in spending on law enforcement. This estimate corresponds with η in (5). The t -ratio on the η is 3.7 and hence the first stage F -statistic is 13.7 which compares favorably to the Stock-Yogo threshold 34 Standard errors estimated using the cluster-bootsrap are extremely similar.
for the effective sample size of an instrumental variables model with a single instrument and a single endogenous regressor (Stock & Yogo, 2005 
Does an increase in police spending lead to less crime?
Any investigation of the effect of law enforcement spending on new prison admissions must necessarily begin by examining the effect of police spending on crime. Given that the effect of police on arrests is expected to be positive, holding crime constant, in order for the effect of police spending on new prison commitments to be negative the effect of police spending on crime should also be negative.
While similar models have been estimated before on similar data, for completeness, we estimate the effect of police expenditures on crime via the 2SLS framework laid out in equations (5) and (6). We find that each $10,000 allocated to law enforcement abates approximately 0.6 index crimes (p < 0.01). 36 Given that the fully-loaded cost of a sworn officer is approximately $130,000 (Chalfin & McCrary, 2017a) , each officer hired, either through deterrence or incapacitation, is estimated to abate approximately 7 index crimes. 37 Of these, approximately 1 will be a violent index crime and the remaining 6 will be property crimes. To verify that these estimates are consistent with those in the extant literature, consider that an average U.S. state employs approximately 13,400 sworn officers during the time period we study and the number of index crimes per state is approximately 226,000. According to our estimates, a 10 percent increase in police strength (1,340 additional officers) would abate approximately 9,600 index crimes. This 35 The Stock-Yogo critical value for 10 percent maximal IV size is 14.6. 36 These computations use state-level data generated by the FBI in which agency crime counts are imputed in years in which an agency does not report to the Uniform Crime Reports. When we estimate the effect of police spending on crime using only the sub-sample of consistent reporters, we obtain an estimate that is very similar. 37 A working paper version of Chalfin & McCrary (2017a) provides a detailed discussion of officer cost calculations.
amounts to a 5.6 percent reduction from a level of 170,000. These estimates suggest a crimepolice elasticity of -0.56 which is broadly consistent with the prior literature. 38
Does an increase in police spending lead to more arrests?
We next consider whether more police spending leads to more arrests as is expected by many to be the case -though in her examination of agency-level data, Owens (2013) finds that, if anything, arrests may decline as a function of additional police hiring though the estimates she reports are not significant at conventional levels. Consistent with Owens (2013) , in our data, we find that each $10,000 allocated to law enforcement leads to -0.1 fewer arrests (for either an index crime or a drug crime) though the estimate is imprecise -the 95 percent confidence interval ranges from a low of -0.26 to a high of 0.06. On a per officer basis, our best guess is that each officer hired leads to 1.3 fewer arrests though it is possible that arrests per additional officer could increase arrests by as many as 0.7.
Of course, many -even most -arrests are for crimes that are unlikely to result in a prison sentence. Given that we are interested in the effect of police spending on prison admissions, perhaps a better question to ask is whether arrests that are actually likely to yield a new prison commitment change as a function of investments in law enforcement. To answer this question,
we construct an estimate of the number of expected prison commitments by multiplying the number of each type of arrest (e.g., robbery, burglary) by the probability that an arrest of a given type leads to a subsequent prison spell. Using a national estimate of the conditional probability of prison given a conviction from the State Court Processing Statistics, we compute expected new commitments (E X P _COM M I T i t ) as:
where P k is the probability of a prison sentence conditional on a conviction for crime k and 
Do more arrests lead to more new prison spells?
We next ask whether more arrests necessarily lead to more prison commitments. While we might expect that this relationship would be positive, for a number of reasons the relationship may be far from perfect. In particular, not all arrests lead to a criminal conviction and, with the exception of crimes like murder and rape, the majority of convictions, even for index crimes, do not result in a prison sentence. To get a sense for how closely related these two quantities are, we regress new court commitments on arrests net of covariates and state and region-year fixed effects. When we do so, the coefficient on the number of arrests is 0.25 (p < 0.01) indicating that the conversion rate between an arrest and a prison spell is approximately 30 percent. This is sensible as the conditional probability of a prison sentence given a conviction is between one third and one half for the most common felony crimes. When we regress new court commitments on expected prison commitments, the coefficient increases to 0.41 (p < 0.01). Thus even when we adjust for the conditional probability of a sentence there is still substantial slippage between arrests and actual new court commitments.
Does an increase in police spending lead to more prison spells?
Finally, we assess the empirical relationship between police spending and actual new commitments to prison. We find that each $10,000 allocated to law enforcement leads to -0.01 fewer expected prison commitments (95% CI: -0.048, 0.028). The coefficient is negative and accords with our prediction using expected prison commitments but is less precisely estimated. The precision of our estimates is not ideal and so we pause here to consider the practical importance of these findings. We note three primary inferences which may be drawn from this analysis.
First, there is a 2 in 3 chance that this parameter estimate is either zero or is negative, indicating that the majority of the evidence is consistent with the idea that investments in law enforcement will reduce the use of incarceration. Second, taking the point estimate (-0.01) at face value suggests that hiring a new officer will lead to -0.13 fewer new prison commitments, a 19 percent reduction in commitments per officer. In elasticity terms, this corresponds with an elasticity of approximately -0.02. In Section VI, we consider what these estimates mean for a state's incarcerated population and conclude that, even using the upper bound of the confidence interval, increases in police hiring are unlikely to lead to a steady state of "mass incarceration." First, we present evidence in favor of the robustness of these findings to alternative specifications.
Robustness
In this section, we consider the robustness of the results presented in the previous section. In Table 5 , we repeat the analysis present in Table 4 using county-level data for California. That is, instead of estimating the effect of state-level spending on law enforcement on state-level prison spells, we estimate the effect of county-level law enforcement spending on the number of new commitments to California prisons from each county, net of county and year fixed effects. This exercise yields estimates that are remarkably similar to those generated from the national data and provide us with confidence that estimates are not an artifact of the level of aggregation of the data. Since the California data were obtained after our preferred specification was chosen for the national analysis, this is also a crucial check against specification searching on the part of the authors. bounds of the confidence interval at face value, then we estimate that a 10 percent increase in police manpower would lead to between a 9.3 percent reduction and a 5.4 percent increase in the number of new prison commitments. A 10 percent increase in police manpower is very large and, at the state level, is virtually unprecedented. Thus we also note that a more realistic increase in law enforcement resources of 2 percent would yield a change in the number of new prison commitments that is between -1.9 percent and +1.1 percent. Of course, any change in the flow will affect the stock of prisoners more slowly and will only change the prison population by these magnitudes in steady state.
Over the last three decades, growth in the number of state prisoners in the United States has quadrupled while growth in the number of sworn law enforcement officers has increased by approximately 50 percent. Even taking the upper limit of the confidence interval at face value, growth in police manpower would explain less than 10 percent of the overall increase in the number of state prisoners. Indeed the data indicate that it is more likely that growth in law enforcement has been a moderating factor with respect to the growth of prisons and suggest as, others have, that changes in punitiveness along both the intensive and extensive margin explain the lion's share of incarceration growth (Raphael & Stoll, 2009 ). We further suggest that federally-induced increases in police hiring during the 1990s have played, at most, a modest role in fueling the growth rate in incarceration during the last fifteen years and may have even been a moderating factor.
These findings create room for optimism that society might be able to achieve a "double dividend" by re-allocating criminal justice dollars towards law enforcement -that it is certainly feasible that investments in police can drive down both crime and incarceration rates. While this possibility has been noted, for some time, by prominent practitioners and while scholarly research has hinted that this double dividend might be possible, this is the first research to directly address its likelihood. That said, we hope that this will not be the last word on this topic as there is more work to be done. The effect of police on the size of the prison population will naturally depend on how police are used -whether new officers will be used in a way that will generate more arrests (or more productive arrests) and how state courts process defendants. While we leverage national data to generate a national estimate, it stands to reason that we have ignored important contextual details and that these details will matter in assessing the degree to which a new wave of police hiring will affect downstream incarceration rates.
Likewise, while strong instruments are difficult to find, we are hopeful that future research can generate greater precision around these point estimates. With smaller confidence intervals, it may be possible to draw a more concrete inference about the sign of relationship between law enforcement spending and the sue of prison.
Finally, we note that while it is unlikely that investments in law enforcement appreciably increase and may even decrease state prison populations, this is not the only way that an increase in the intensity of policing affects American communities. To the extent that more police surveillance leads to an increase in stop or search rates, this may serve to fray the already tenuous relationship between police officers and many disadvantaged communities. Likewise, it may be the case the police hiring does, in fact, increase the size of local jail populations and the extent to which the net has been widened for low-level offenders who have become "frequent fliers" in jail settings. 40 Since the majority of individuals who find themselves under correctional supervision in the United States are either in jail or are supervised in the community, this research cannot tell us about that margin of the corrections-law enforcement relationship.
Nevertheless, given that prison is the most socially and financially costly of available sanctions, it stands to reason that a strategy that potentially leads to less prison and less crime should, at least, merit further discussion. Note: For each set of models, the following covariates are included: % of the population that is aged 15-24, % employed, % foreign born, % Hispanic, % male, population, % Non-Hispanic Black, the unemployment rate, % in poverty, % without a high school diploma or equivalent, , total budget, total expenditure on corrections, and an indicator if the governor is Republican. All models are estimated using 1997 population weights. Note: For each set of models, the following covariates are included: % of the population that is aged 15-24, % employed, % foreign born, % Hispanic, % male, population, % Non-Hispanic Black, the unemployment rate, % in poverty, % without a high school diploma or equivalent, , total budget, total expenditure on corrections, and an indicator if the governor is Republican. All models are estimated using 1997 population weights. Note: For each set of models, the following covariates are included: % of the population that is aged 15-24, % employed, % foreign born, % Hispanic, % male, population, % Non-Hispanic Black, the unemployment rate, % in poverty, % without a high school diploma or equivalent, , total budget, total expenditure on corrections, and an indicator if the governor is Republican. All models are estimated using 1997 population weights. 
